This comprehensive report examines malware designed to threaten or execute file deletion, including ransomware variants, wipers, and emerging hybrid threats that combine encryption with destruction. The analysis reveals that file-deleting malware represents one of the most destructive categories of cyberthreats, with threats ranging from financially motivated attacks to state-sponsored sabotage operations that have caused billions of dollars in global damage.
Foundational Understanding of File-Deleting Malware
Malware is malicious software designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems. The category of malware that threatens to delete files occupies a particularly dangerous space within the cyberthreat landscape because it combines the destructive capability of permanent data loss with various extortion or sabotage objectives. Unlike traditional malware that seeks to maintain access or steal information covertly, file-deleting malware announces its presence and threats through ransom notes, countdown timers, or simply by rendering systems inoperable. The intent behind such malware varies considerably, ranging from financial gain through ransom demands to geopolitical sabotage and competitive advantage destruction.
The goal of malware is to cause havoc and steal information or resources for monetary gain or sheer sabotage intent. Within the file-deletion category, threat actors employ these capabilities through multiple operational models. Some attackers use deletion threats primarily as leverage to coerce ransom payments, while others deploy file-deleting malware as a genuine destructive weapon to disable critical infrastructure or punish targets for perceived wrongs. The distinction between these approaches significantly impacts how organizations should respond to threats and what recovery options may be available.
The technical mechanisms underlying file-deleting threats are sophisticated and specifically engineered to ensure permanence. Rather than simply removing file directory entries, advanced file-deleting malware overwrites data with random or patterned bytes to prevent forensic recovery. This represents a fundamental difference from basic file deletion, where the data persists on disk until new information overwrites it. Advanced threats recognize that simple deletion leaves data recoverable and therefore employ multi-pass overwriting techniques that make recovery nearly impossible without sophisticated forensic analysis and significant resources.
Ransomware With File Deletion Capabilities: The Traditional Threat Model
Core Ransomware Operations and File-Locking Mechanisms
Ransomware is software that uses encryption to disable a target’s access to its data until a ransom is paid. Traditional ransomware operates through a well-established playbook that has evolved significantly over the past decade. The basic model involves encrypting files to make them inaccessible and then demanding payment in cryptocurrency for decryption keys. However, the relationship between ransomware and file deletion has become increasingly complex, with modern variants incorporating deletion threats as a complementary tactic rather than the primary mechanism.
In early ransomware attacks, the threat model relied on encryption alone—victims could theoretically recover data if they paid the ransom and received legitimate decryption keys. However, ransomware operators quickly recognized that some victims might refuse payment or attempt recovery through other means, prompting the addition of file deletion capabilities. Ransomware authors sometimes make mistakes that prevent the data from being decrypted when a ransom is paid, or sometimes there is no intention of ever restoring the data. This observation highlights a critical vulnerability in the ransomware business model: when operators lose the decryption keys or choose not to honor payment agreements, their malware becomes indistinguishable from destructive wipers.
Shadow Copy Deletion and System Recovery Prevention
One of the most insidious tactics employed by ransomware is the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies, which are system backups maintained by Windows. Ransomware uses `vssadmin.exe` to delete shadow copies, which are backups, to prevent victims from restoring files to a previous state. This technique represents a critical escalation in ransomware sophistication because it eliminates what was previously an escape route for many victims. Before ransomware operators began systematically destroying shadow copies, organizations could often restore files from these backups without paying ransoms.
The command used for shadow copy deletion is typically `vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet`, which removes all Volume Shadow Copy Service snapshots from the system. An alternative method involves using `DeviceIoControl` to resize shadow copy storage, causing existing snapshots to be deleted when the new storage size is smaller than the data already stored. These techniques are now standard components of modern ransomware, with security researchers tracking the attempt to delete shadow copies as a reliable indicator of ransomware presence.
Detection via vssadmin has helped uncover 496 confirmed threats since its detection mechanism was created, and this detector has been useful in identifying other ransomware like Robbinhood and more sophisticated threats like Ryuk. The significance of this detection method cannot be overstated—by monitoring for attempts to manipulate Volume Shadow Copy services, security teams can often identify and contain ransomware infections before extensive file encryption occurs. The technique has been formalized in security frameworks as MITRE ATT&CK technique T1490, “Inhibit System Recovery,” which documents the adversary tactic of preventing system recovery.
Jigsaw Ransomware: The First True File-Deleting Ransomware
Jigsaw ransomware is the first strain that actually deletes files of their victims every hour. This distinction is historically important because Jigsaw represents the first successful implementation of a genuine file deletion threat rather than mere encryption. Unlike earlier ransomware that encrypted data and demanded payment for decryption, Jigsaw created a countdown timer and actually deleted files if the ransom was not paid within specified timeframes.
The Jigsaw attack model worked as follows: once a victim’s system was infected, a countdown timer starts, and if the $150 ransom isn’t paid within the first hour one file is deleted, and as time goes on, more than one file is deleted every hour, with that number increasing each time the 60 minute timer is reset. Furthermore, every time the program is restarted, as many as 1,000 files are deleted! This escalation pattern created genuine urgency, as victims faced not just theoretical data loss but continuous, observable destruction of their files.
Jigsaw encrypts 226 different file types, appending the .FUN, .BTC, and .KKK extensions to them via the AES encryption algorithm. The malware specifically targeted common file types including documents, spreadsheets, archives, and media files—essentially everything of potential value to typical computer users. The significance of Jigsaw extends beyond its technical capabilities; it established the proof-of-concept that actual file deletion could be used as a coercive mechanism, influencing the design of subsequent ransomware variants.
Wiper Malware: Pure Destruction Without Ransom
Defining Characteristics and Motivations
A wiper is a type of malware with a single purpose: to erase user data and ensure it can’t be recovered. This fundamental distinction separates wipers from traditional ransomware: wipers aim for pure destruction rather than financial extortion. Any malware that destroys data or severely disrupts networks can be considered destructive malware. The motivations behind wiper deployment differ significantly from ransomware operations, typically involving state-sponsored cyberwarfare, competitive sabotage, or revenge operations rather than financial gain.
Wiper malware is deployed with a range of strategic objectives: state-backed actors may use it for pure sabotage, aiming to disrupt production or retaliate for geopolitical actions, and in some cases, wipers are disguised as ransomware to serve as false flags to confuse attribution efforts and complicate the response.] The use of fake ransom notes by wipers serves multiple purposes—it can mislead victims into believing recovery is possible through payment, delay recognition of the attack’s truly destructive nature, and complicate attribution by suggesting criminal rather than state-sponsored motivation.
File Deletion Mechanisms in Wiper Malware
Wiper malware employs several sophisticated techniques to ensure permanent data destruction. While wiperware typically utilizes techniques that render the files unrecoverable, a simpler form of similar malware simply deletes the files and is appropriately called deleters. The distinction between deleters and wipers reflects a spectrum of destructive capability. When a file is simply deleted through standard operating system calls, the file’s data remains on the disk until new data overwrites it, making recovery possible with forensic tools. However, ransomware and wiperware use means that overwrite the data in the original file.]
One common method involves overwriting entire disks or specific data blocks with junk data, a process that can be repeated multiple times to ensure that the data cannot be recovered. This multi-pass overwriting technique, sometimes called secure deletion or cryptographic erasure, destroys all traces of original data. Some wipers use patterns of specific characters for overwriting—for instance, different variants of wiper malware discovered during the 2013 South Korean attacks used repeating strings like “PRINCIPES” or “HASTATI.” to overwrite drives, making the attack traceable to specific threat actors.
Master Boot Record Corruption
One of the most devastating techniques employed by wiper malware is the destruction of the Master Boot Record (MBR), the critical system sector that contains instructions for booting the operating system. The Master Boot Record is the information in the first sector of any hard disk that identifies how and where an operating system is located so that it can be booted into the computer’s main storage or Random Access Memory. By destroying the MBR, attackers render systems completely unable to boot, making them functionally useless even if data could theoretically be recovered.
Attackers have used destructive wiper malware to destroy the Master Boot Record of a computer rendering it inoperable, and by destroying the MBR, it makes it so the machine cannot load the operating system. Advanced wipers also target related boot structures. Wiper malware can delete logical volumes or partitions on a disk, with a critical target being the GUID Partition Table (GPT, or in older systems the Master Boot Record (MBR)), which control the operating system’s loading process. By overwriting or deleting the GPT, the malware prevents the system from booting, rendering the hardware unusable.
Notable Wiper Malware Incidents and Case Studies
Shamoon: The First Major Wiper Attack
The virus was used for cyberwarfare against national oil companies including Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco and Qatar’s RasGas, with a group named “Cutting Sword of Justice” claiming responsibility for an attack on 30,000 Saudi Aramco workstations, causing the company to spend more than a week restoring their services. The Shamoon attack in 2012 marked the emergence of wiper malware as a serious threat to critical infrastructure and represents one of the earliest documented large-scale destructive cyberattacks against a major organization.
Shamoon was designed to erase and overwrite hard drive data with a corrupted image and report the addresses of infected computers back to the computer inside the company’s network, and the malware had a logic bomb which triggered the master boot record and data wiping payload at 11:08 am local time on Wednesday, August 15. The coordinated timing of the attack demonstrates the sophisticated planning involved in state-sponsored wiper operations. The malware used a scheduled trigger to ensure simultaneous activation across all infected systems, maximizing disruption and preventing staggered recovery efforts.
The wiper component utilizes an Eldos-produced driver known as RawDisk to achieve direct user-mode access to a hard drive without using Windows APIs, identifies the locations of all files on the infected computers and erases them, and sends information about the files destroyed to the attacker and then overwrites the erased files with corrupted data so they cannot be recovered. In the 2012 attack, Shamoon used an image of a burning U.S. flag to overwrite destroyed data, adding a psychological and political dimension to the attack. In the 2016 attack it used a photo of the body of Alan Kurdi, highlighting the political messaging embedded within the malware.
NotPetya: Wiper Masquerading as Ransomware
NotPetya is a strain of malware that had many similarities to Petya but behaved differently, and in June 2017, a new type of ransomware that resembled Petya in many respects infected organizations around the world, and because of its similarities to Petya, with a few crucial differences, security vendor Kaspersky dubbed it “NotPetya.” The NotPetya attack represents a watershed moment in understanding the distinction between ransomware-as-cover and purely destructive malware. While the malware displayed ransom notes and demanded payment, the underlying intent was destruction rather than extortion.
Unlike most ransomware, NotPetya seemed to be purely destructive, with no way to reverse the damage it caused and essentially wiped files out completely with no hope of recovery. The malware displayed a ransom message demanding $300 in Bitcoin, but the message displayed a fake, randomly generated Bitcoin address, and there was no way for the attackers to collect the ransom, further suggesting that the goal of NotPetya was destruction, not financial gain. This critical distinction—between actual ransom demand infrastructure and fake payment mechanisms—revealed the true nature of the attack.
NotPetya is a strain of ransomware that was first identified in 2016, and unlike some older ransomware strains, which only encrypt certain important files in order to extort the victim, Petya locks up a computer’s entire hard disk, specifically by encrypting a computer’s Master File Table (MFT), making it impossible to access any files on the hard disk. NotPetya escalated this approach by encrypting the entire hard disk itself instead of just the MFT, spreading suddenly and rapidly, and quickly infecting entire networks using various vulnerability exploits and credential theft methods.
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Get Protected NowThe attack’s impact extended far beyond the initial Ukrainian targets. The 2017 NotPetya attack, widely considered the most costly cyberattack in history, masqueraded as ransomware but was a wiper that overwrote the Master Boot Record, causing global disruption for businesses like Maersk (losing access to ~49,000 laptops and 1,000+ applications, costing $200–300 million), FedEx/TNT Express (global delivery disruption, ~$400 million), and Mondelez International (plants shut down).
WhisperGate and HermeticWiper: Coordinated Ukrainian Attacks
On Jan. 15, 2022, a set of malware dubbed WhisperGate was reported to have been deployed against Ukrainian targets, with the incident widely reported to contain three individual components deployed by the same adversary, including a malicious bootloader that corrupts detected local disks, a Discord-based downloader and a file wiper.] The WhisperGate attack demonstrated the evolution of wiper malware into modular, multi-component toolkits that coordinate multiple destructive operations.
HermeticWiper uses a benign partition manager driver to perform its wiping capabilities corrupting all available physical drives’ Master Boot Record (MBR), partition, and file system (FAT or NTFS). This approach is particularly sophisticated because it leverages legitimate software—a copy of a partition management driver signed by a Chinese company—to perform destructive operations. HermeticWiper abuses a legitimate EaseUS partition management driver, approaching similar to the Iranian Shamoon and North Korean DarkSeoul wipers, which abused the ElDos Raw Disk driver to obtain access to low-level disk functions.
HermeticWiper corrupts the master boot record (MBR), overwrites files in specific system locations, and modifies partition information, and to corrupt the MBR, it enumerates each of the physical disks, iterating through \??\PhysicalDrive0 to \??\PhysicalDrive100, and then overwrites the first 512 bytes. The targeting of critical system files and locations suggests careful planning to maximize system damage while minimizing recovery chances. The malware also overwrites files under the following paths: C:\Documents and Settings\, C:\System Volume Information\, C:\Windows\SYSVOL\, C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs. By destroying Windows event logs, the malware eliminates crucial forensic artifacts that would help investigators understand the attack.
Recent Wiper Threats: PathWiper and Emerging Variants
A newly discovered wiper malware, PathWiper, was deployed in Ukraine in June 2025 via legitimate endpoint administration tools, overwriting files, and the grueling recovery has involved full rebuilds. PathWiper represents the latest evolution in wiper technology, introducing increased precision compared to earlier variants. Unlike earlier wipers that blindly iterated through drive numbers, PathWiper is precise, verifying valid volumes before corrupting them.
PathWiper has been found to share some level of similarity with HermeticWiper (aka FoxBlade, KillDisk, or NEARMISS), which was detected coinciding with Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, and the HermeticWiper malware is attributed to the Russia-linked Sandworm group. The continued development of wiper malware by state-sponsored actors indicates that these destructive capabilities remain strategically valuable in cyberwarfare operations.
In the first half of 2025, wiper malware demonstrated significant escalation against industrial systems. In late June, sources identified three new Iranian-linked wiper malware families (BlueWipe, SewerGoo, and BeepFreeze) targeting critical infrastructure and government networks in Israel and Albania, with BlueWipe and SewerGoo deployed against Israeli targets with the apparent objective of wiping or disabling storage devices. This diversification of wiper development across multiple state actors suggests an arms race in destructive capabilities.
Hybrid Threats: Combining Encryption and Deletion
Evolution Toward Combined Tactics
The distinction between ransomware and wipers has become increasingly blurred as threat actors recognize the effectiveness of combining both approaches. Ransomware with built-in wiper functionality represents an emerging threat category that maximizes pressure on victims through both encryption and destruction. Organizations now face threats that encrypt data for ransom while simultaneously possessing the capability to permanently delete files if victims refuse payment or fail to meet deadlines.
Anubis is an emerging Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that combines file encryption with file destruction—a rare dual-threat capability. This emerging group exemplifies a troubling trend where ransomware operators are adding wiper functionality to increase pressure on victims. The ransomware has an optional “wipe mode” feature which permanently erases the contents of the files, suggesting that the threat actor could wipe their victim’s files if the ransom is not paid. This escalation represents a fundamental shift in threat model, where payment delays or refusals trigger permanent destruction rather than simply continued encryption.
Anubis Ransomware: The Dual-Threat Model
Anubis runs a flexible affiliate program, offering negotiable revenue splits and supporting additional monetization paths like data extortion and access sales, and is active since December 2024, with claimed victims in multiple sectors including healthcare and construction, across regions such as Australia, Canada, Peru, and the U.S. The operational model demonstrates sophisticated business practices, with the group offering flexibility in commission structures and supporting multiple extortion approaches.
The technical implementation of Anubis’s dual capabilities is revealing: The ransomware takes multiple parameters as input and depends on them to function properly, including parameters for keys, privilege elevation, wipe mode, excluded directories, and specific encryption paths. This modular approach allows operators to customize their attacks based on victim type and situation. Additionally, the ransomware includes a wiper feature using /WIPEMODE parameter, which can permanently delete the contents of a file, preventing any recovery attempt. By offering operators the choice between ransom recovery or file destruction, Anubis maximizes revenue opportunities while maintaining destructive capabilities as a last resort.
Technical Mechanisms of File Deletion
Data Overwriting Techniques
The methods used to delete files have evolved significantly from simple file system operations to sophisticated overwriting schemes. Data overwriting is one common method that overwrites entire disks or specific data blocks with junk data, a process that can be repeated multiple times to ensure that the data cannot be recovered. Modern file deletion malware recognizes that single-pass overwrites may be insufficient against forensic recovery, leading to implementations of multiple overwriting passes.
The distinction between simple deletion and secure deletion is critical for understanding malware capabilities. When a file is simply deleted through standard operating system commands, the file’s directory entry is removed but the actual data remains on disk. When a file is simply deleted—whether by malware or a user—the file’s data still exists on the disk until it is overwritten by new data, which depending on the space available and how many new files are being generated could take some time.] Forensic specialists exploit this persistence to recover supposedly deleted files.
Sophisticated malware circumvents this recovery possibility through deliberate data destruction. With specialized software and techniques, the remaining data can be recovered, and in many cases this includes the entire file, which is why ransomware and wiperware use means that overwrite the data in the original file.] The overwriting process destroys all forensic traces of the original data, making recovery functionally impossible without specialized expertise and potentially significant resources.
File System Structure Attacks
Advanced wiper malware targets not just user data but also critical file system structures that organize that data. For NTFS, it also corrupts the Master File Table (MFT) which holds all information about a file to ensure that data will be unrecoverable. The Master File Table is essentially the index that Windows uses to locate all files on the disk; by corrupting it, the malware ensures that even if data physically remains on disk, the operating system cannot locate or access it.
Wiper malware can delete logical volumes or partitions on a disk, with a critical target being the GUID Partition Table (GPT, or in older systems the Master Boot Record (MBR)), which control the operating system’s loading process. By targeting the GPT rather than just user data, wipers eliminate even the possibility of mounting the drive and accessing its contents through alternative methods. This represents a fundamental difference from attacks targeting only user files—GPT corruption affects the entire disk structure.
Infection Vectors and Propagation Methods
Initial Compromise Techniques
File-deleting malware gains access to target systems through multiple vectors, reflecting the sophistication of modern cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors. Wiper malware enters a system using a plethora of attack vectors, with commonly encountered methods being phishing emails with embedded links or attachments the user has been tricked into downloading without knowing what they do, and other forms of attack transferring the malware across from removable media, in the form of USB keys. The reliance on social engineering alongside technical exploitation reflects the human element of cybersecurity vulnerability.
Phishing is typically done through fraudulent emails, text messages, or websites that closely mimic legitimate sources, like banks, online services, or trusted organizations, with messages often creating a sense of urgency, such as claiming your account has been compromised or offering a fake reward, prompting victims to act without thinking. For file-deleting malware specifically, phishing campaigns often distribute malicious documents that exploit vulnerabilities in software like Microsoft Office, PDF readers, or other commonly used applications.
It typically spreads through phishing emails, malicious downloads, exploited vulnerabilities, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exploits, and supply chain attacks. The diversity of infection vectors reflects attackers’ recognition that no single method works universally. Organizations defending against file-deletion threats must therefore implement multi-layered defenses addressing each potential attack vector.
Supply Chain and Software Update Exploitation
A particularly insidious infection vector involves compromising legitimate software update mechanisms. The malicious code writes the information collected into the Windows registry under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\WC key using Cred and Prx value names, suggesting that the backdoored module did in fact run on that computer. The NotPetya attack leveraged this approach by compromising M.E.Doc, Ukrainian accounting software, to distribute the destructive wiper to thousands of organizations.
A legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc was used by the attackers to push DiskCoder.C malware in the initial phase of the attack, with the malware masquerading as typical ransomware by encrypting the data on the computer and demanding $300 in bitcoins for recovery. This attack vector proved particularly effective because it combined trust in legitimate software with the stealth of automatic updates, allowing the malware to spread to numerous organizations before detection.
Impact and Consequences of File-Deletion Malware
Organizational and Economic Damage
The consequences of file-deletion malware attacks extend far beyond the immediate technical disruption. The 2012 Shamoon attack, widely attributed to Iran, struck Saudi Aramco and erased more than 30,000 computers, forcing the company to spend more than a week restoring their services. Such incidents generate not just technical recovery costs but also business interruption expenses that can dwarf the technical remediation efforts.
In the damage that results, a significant amount of information will not be recoverable, and the injured organization’s critical software applications and databases will be useless, and it will have to engage in a huge effort to reinstall software and recover information from backups, if any existed in the first place, causing enormous downtime and operational challenges. Organizations without adequate backup procedures face potential complete loss of operational capability, forcing manual workarounds and extended recovery periods.
The financial impact can be catastrophic, particularly for critical infrastructure. The 2017 NotPetya attack caused an estimated $10 billion in damages worldwide. Manufacturing facilities may be forced to shut down production lines completely, transportation systems may experience severe delays or complete service interruptions, and healthcare institutions may lose access to patient records and critical systems.
Data Integrity and Forensic Challenges
File-deletion malware presents unique forensic challenges that complicate incident response and attribution. Once the malware executes its deletion commands, files and systems can become permanently unrecoverable, representing not only a temporary short-term disruptive operation but also having long-term effects because organizations will be unable to recover key information necessary for daily functions. The permanent destruction of data eliminates the possibility of later recovery, forcing organizations to rely on offline backups or accept permanent loss.
The malware employs anti-forensics practices throughout its execution, such as immediately after execution loading itself in memory and deleting itself from the disk, and zeroing out the file contents on disk to ensure that the malware cannot be recovered via disk forensics. Advanced wipers deliberately destroy forensic artifacts to complicate investigation and attribution, erasing system logs, event records, and other evidence that would help security teams understand the attack.
Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
File-deletion malware poses particularly severe risks to critical infrastructure systems that control essential services. Industroyer is the first ever known malware specifically designed to attack electrical grids, at the same time being the fourth malware publicly revealed to target industrial control systems, after Stuxnet, Havex, and BlackEnergy. The development of malware targeting specific industrial control system protocols demonstrates adversary sophistication and the strategic importance placed on disrupting critical infrastructure.
The detailed analysis of Industroyer revealed that the malware was designed to disrupt the working processes of industrial control systems, specifically those used in electrical substations, with a data wiper component designed to erase system-crucial Registry keys and overwrite files to make the system unbootable and recovery from the attack harder. The combination of operational disruption (through control of electrical equipment) and data destruction (through system wiping) creates compounded impact that extends recovery timelines significantly.
Detection and Defense Mechanisms
Behavioral Detection Methods
Security professionals have developed sophisticated methods to detect file-deletion malware by monitoring for characteristic behaviors. Detection via vssadmin has helped uncover 496 confirmed threats since its detection mechanism was created, and this detector has been useful in identifying other ransomware like Robbinhood and more sophisticated threats like Ryuk. The attempt to delete shadow copies has become such a reliable indicator of malicious intent that it forms a standard component of modern endpoint detection and response systems.
The command line parameter—`vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows`—offers a great opportunity to detect ransomware, and looking for vssadmin manipulation is a reliable method for identifying other ransomware like Robbinhood and more sophisticated threats like Ryuk. Security teams can configure alerts to trigger whenever this command is executed, providing near-real-time notification of potential ransomware activity. Additionally, Atomic Red Team tests will help security teams test the detection of this technique in their environment, using PowerShell with command line `win32_shadowcopy` and Vssadmin.exe with command line `resize shadowstorage`.
Backup and Recovery Strategies
The most effective defense against file-deletion malware is the maintenance of comprehensive backup strategies that prevent total data loss. Organizations that diligently back up their data can recover from a ransomware attack much faster than those who do not, as they can wipe their systems clean without losing a single file. However, the mere existence of backups is insufficient if they themselves become compromised or encrypted by malware.
Backup version should be used to recover data, and there have been cases where attackers have destroyed copied files or disrupted recovery processes before conducting ransomware attacks. Sophisticated threat actors recognize that backups represent the primary recovery mechanism and actively target backup systems during their attacks. Multiple backups should be kept in different locations following the 3, 2, 1 rule: three copies of every file, two different storage types, and one offsite location. This redundancy ensures that even if attackers destroy one or two backup copies, at least one clean copy remains available for recovery.
The protection of backups extends beyond location to include immutability and encryption. Offline or immutable backups stored separately from the primary network cannot be encrypted or deleted by malware that compromises the primary systems. Some organizations implement immutable backup storage that prevents any modifications to backed-up data for specified retention periods, making it impossible for attackers to destroy backup copies even if they achieve administrative access.
Volume Shadow Copy Protection
The Volume Shadow Copy – Protect feature in CrowdStrike Falcon prevents unauthorized processes from deleting Windows shadow copies, and when enabled, it blocks common ransomware techniques like the `vssadmin delete shadows` command that attackers use to eliminate backup restore points. Modern endpoint protection platforms incorporate dedicated capabilities to defend shadow copies specifically because of their critical importance to recovery.
Shadow copy deletion is a standard component of modern ransomware operations, and CrowdStrike’s own analysis of LockBit ransomware demonstrates the stark difference between systems with Volume Shadow Copy protection enabled versus those without it. When the protection is active, ransomware loses one of its primary advantages: the ability to eliminate recovery options. Organizations implementing such protection should nevertheless validate proper configuration and avoid false positives that might block legitimate system operations.
Incident Response and Remediation
Detection and Containment Phase
Speed could not be more important for incident response, making it critical to identify attacks as early as possible no matter where on the attack surface they strike or what tactics they use to evade detection. The early detection of file-deletion malware provides the critical window for containing its spread before extensive damage occurs. Various best practices for incident containment include isolating affected system(s), blocking malicious IP addresses, and disabling compromised accounts.
To remove ransomware, isolate infected devices by disconnecting any device infected by malware from the internet ASAP to prevent the malware from spreading, and think of it as a salmonella outbreak—to stop the bacteria from spreading, anything contaminated needs to be recalled. Network isolation prevents lateral movement and prevents the malware from communicating with command-and-control servers to receive additional destructive instructions.
Boot the device into safe mode, which prevents the malware from launching when you start your computer, giving you a better shot at removing it. Safe mode boots Windows with minimal drivers and services, preventing most malware from executing automatically. This limited operating system state provides a safer environment for malware removal operations.
Removal and Recovery Operations
Use ransomware removal tools—reliable ransomware removal tools provide an extra layer of security by automatically scanning and deleting ransomware. Security vendors have developed specialized tools capable of identifying and removing known ransomware variants. Microsoft Defender can be used as more of a preventative tool, featuring real-time protection, cloud-based threat detection, and behavioral analysis to identify and block malicious activity before it can encrypt files. Additionally, the No More Ransom Project offers decryption tools, depending on the ransomware variant.
If a known decryptor exists for the strain of ransomware that attacked you, then yes, there is a solid chance you can undo the damage, and if not, your options can be limited to merely restoring from a backup or consulting security experts for ransomware recovery assistance. The availability of decryption tools for specific ransomware variants provides sometimes-free recovery options, making it worth checking specialized resources before paying ransoms.
Long-Term Recovery and Lessons Learned
After an incident, it’s tempting to look forwards rather than backwards, but never neglect the post-incident review, as assessing each phase of the response, from first detection to final eradication, and looking honestly at what went well and what could be improved on leads each response to be more effective than the last. Organizations should implement systematic post-incident reviews to capture lessons and integrate them into improved security practices.
Dedicate the time and resources to review each incident, and the response, in detail, and be honest about what went right and wrong, turning the lessons learned into specific changes and improvements to prevent repeat mistakes while consistently improving cybersecurity performance and capability. The goal of incident response should extend beyond restoring immediate functionality to building organizational resilience against future attacks.
Emerging Threats and Future Outlook
Evolution Toward Hybrid and Polymorphic Threats
The landscape of file-deletion malware continues evolving with threat actors incorporating new techniques and approaches. Ransomware actors actively exploited unpatched SimpleHelp Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) software in Q2 2025, with ransomware groups like DragonForce leveraging CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, and CVE-2024-57728 to achieve remote code execution and privilege escalation in targeted environments. The exploitation of RMM software demonstrates how attackers leverage trusted administrative tools to gain the access necessary for file-deletion malware deployment.
The number of industrial sector victims notably increased from 13 in Q1 to 49 in Q2 2025, with SafePay maintaining centralized control, directly managing all attack phases from initial intrusion through negotiation, encryption, and data leaks. The targeting of industrial sectors specifically suggests an intentional shift toward critical infrastructure disruption alongside financial extortion.
State-Sponsored Wiper Development
State actors continue developing and deploying wiper capabilities as strategic tools. In the first half of 2025, wiper malware has emerged as a clear escalation in threats to industrial systems, with sources identifying three new Iranian-linked wiper malware families (BlueWipe, SewerGoo, and BeepFreeze) targeting critical infrastructure and government networks in Israel and Albania. The continued development of wiper malware by multiple nation-states indicates strategic value in destructive capabilities for geopolitical confrontation.
Around the same time, ransomware‑as‑a‑service group Anubis introduced a “wipe mode” that destroys directories outright, thereby transforming extortionware into sabotage. The blurring of lines between ransomware and wiper capabilities reflects the maturation of threat actor capabilities and the recognition that combining approaches maximizes impact.
Protecting Against the Malware Deletion Threat
The malware landscape encompassing threats to delete files represents one of the most destructive categories of cyberthreats, ranging from financially motivated ransomware operations to state-sponsored sabotage campaigns. File-deletion malware operates across a spectrum from pure ransomware with encryption-based locking mechanisms to pure wipers designed for complete data destruction, with increasingly sophisticated hybrid approaches combining multiple destructive techniques.
The technical capabilities continue advancing, with modern variants employing sophisticated file system attacks, multiple overwriting passes, anti-forensic techniques, and coordinated multi-component operations. The motivations behind such malware vary considerably, from financial gain through ransom demands to geopolitical sabotage and competitive advantage destruction, with state actors and organized criminal groups demonstrating sophisticated operational capabilities.
Defense against file-deletion malware requires comprehensive, multi-layered approaches addressing detection, prevention, and recovery. Organizations must implement robust backup strategies maintaining redundant copies in geographically separated locations with immutable protection mechanisms. Endpoint protection systems should incorporate behavioral detection capabilities specifically targeting file-deletion malware’s characteristic activities. Network segmentation and access controls must limit lateral movement opportunities, while regular security awareness training addresses the human element of most initial compromises.
As threat actors continue innovating and evolving their capabilities—combining encryption with destruction, exploiting legitimate administrative tools, and targeting critical infrastructure—organizations must maintain vigilant security postures supported by incident response plans regularly tested and updated. The stakes involved in file-deletion malware attacks warrant investment in sophisticated detection capabilities, comprehensive backup infrastructure, and professional incident response resources to ensure organizational resilience against these devastating threats.
